INTRODUCTION
Evolution of clutch size is a central theme in life-history theory (Ro¡ 1992; Stearns 1992) . In an early formulation, Lack (1947) suggested that a female should produce the clutch size that results in the maximum number of surviving young, thus acknowledging the fact that an increased clutch size will result in less investment per o¡spring. Williams (1966) suggested that parents also trade current against future reproduction and that the optimal clutch size is the one which maximizes lifetime reproductive success. However, these and other models of optimal clutch size implicitly assume a situation with uniparental care (Godfray & Parker 1991) .
Whenever more than one parent provides parental care there will be sexual con£ict over the amount and division of care (Trivers 1972) . First, there will be a con£ict over the division of parental care because it will pay one parent to reduce its investment if it can thereby`persuade' the other parent to increase its investment (Chase 1980; Houston & Davies 1985) . Second, there may be sexual con£ict over the amount of care that should be given because males and females do not value current and future reproduction in the same way. For example, in animals with internal fertilization social and genetic motherhood are often identical, whereas a social father may not always be certain that he is also the genetic father (Westneat et al. 1990) . Reproduction may also a¡ect future fecundity di¡erently in males and females because males' ¢tness is often more limited by the availability of mates than that of females (Trivers 1972) . For example, males typically have greater opportunities for increasing their ¢tness through extra-pair copulations (Westneat et al. 1990) or by attracting additional mates (Emlen & Oring 1977) and may therefore pay a higher opportunity cost in terms of lost ¢tness by providing care. Some studies have directly demonstrated that use of time and energy for paternal care and mate attraction (Whittingham 1993; Cucco & Malacarne 1997) or paternal care and mate guarding of additional females (Hasselquist & Bensch 1991; Whittingham 1994 ) may be in con£ict. The costs and bene¢ts of parental care will determine whether either or both parents care or not (Maynard Smith 1977) and, in a situation with biparental care, there may be an evolutionary stable division of labour. A stable division of labour will depend on sexual di¡erences in the costs and bene¢ts of providing this care (Chase 1980; Houston & Davies 1985; Winkler 1987) .
Clutch size is a female trait which males have little possibility of in£uencing directly. Hence, optimal clutch size will re£ect the costs and bene¢ts to females. However, these costs and bene¢ts will depend on the amount of investment males provide and it is therefore important to consider the social context in which clutch size evolves (Svensson & Sheldon 1998) . In other words, the optimal clutch size for a female will depend on the expected care of the male (Houston & Davies 1985; Westneat et al. 1990; Smith 1995) . On the other hand, clutch size strongly a¡ects the male bene¢t of paternal care and, therefore, male care should depend on the clutch size produced by the female. For example, if a female produces a larger clutch, it may bene¢t both the male and female to increase their investment (Houston & Davies 1985; Winkler 1987; Beissinger 1990; Wright & Cuthill 1990) . Hence, the prevailing mating system may a¡ect the direction of clutch size evolution, but the clutch size may also a¡ect the mating system through its e¡ect on male allocation of investment between parental care and mate attraction. Therefore, there will be joint evolution of clutch size and mating system.
In this paper, we model the joint evolution of parental care and clutch size under sexual con£ict. We do this by developing and extending an earlier model of the division of parental care (Houston & Davies 1985) . First, we show that, if males have greater opportunities of ¢nding additional mates, males' decision of whether to care for o¡spring or not should depend on clutch size. Then we show that the female ¢tness gradient on clutch size (which dictates the future course of clutch size evolution) depends on whether or not males care. The predicted evolutionarily stable clutch size may therefore depend on the initial clutch size. The main results are that the prevailing mating system a¡ects optimal clutch size, that evolution of clutch size will stabilize the mating system and that, under certain circumstances, the resulting combination of mating system and optimal clutch size may be the result of initial conditions.
MODELS (a) The general model
The ¢tness of a reproducing individual is the sum of its returns from the current and all future reproductive events. Assuming that reproduction is costly (Williams 1966; Bell & Koufopanou 1986 ), optimization of investment in o¡spring involves trading investment in current reproduction against the cost incurred in the form of lost future opportunities for reproducing. For seasonally reproducing animals, this loss may occur in the same and/or future seasons. A simple ¢tness function (l) for describing this is
where n is the current clutch size, c is juvenile survival and p is the sum of all future reproductive output. Each amount of parental investment (x) received increases the young's survival positively whereas the parent's future ¢tness prospect decreases with both the size of their investment per young and the size of the current clutch. In situations where resources for reproduction are limited, the optimum amount of help provided to an o¡spring will often be related to clutch size (Winkler 1987) . Formally, under the assumption that parental care is optimized in ecological (behavioural) time, there is a function x * (n) that solves l'(x)ˆ0 and l''(x) 5 0. To begin with, we will consider a mating system where only females care for the young and denote a single female's optimized care as x s * (n) (see Appendix A for a derivation). In such a mating system, the optimal clutch size which maximizes lifetime reproductive success (l) must be calculated as the optimum n (henceforth n 1 * ) of
In order to be meaningful, this clutch size must not give a negative optimum parental investment, that is x s * (n 1 * ) must be greater than or equal to zero. This gives the optimum clutch size under the assumption of optimized behaviour.
Because there are two parents, there will be sexual con£ict over parental investment that may be resolved by (i) stable biparental care, (ii) female care only, (iii) male care only, or (iv) unstable biparental care where one or the other of the parents may care, the solution being dependent on the initial conditions (Ratnieks 1996) . When both parents provide parental care there will be con£ict over the amount of investment each sex provides. This is because, if either of the parents decides to increase their investment, the other may decrease its investment and gain higher future ¢tness (Houston & Davies 1985; Winkler 1987; Wright & Cuthill 1989; Motro 1994; Sozou & Houston 1994 ). This evolutionary game has traditionally been modelled assuming a single decision rather than using evolutionary stable negotiation rules. It has been shown that evolutionary stable negotiation rules result in parents being less responsive to variation in the e¡ort of the other sex and a lower total level of parental e¡ort (McNamara et al. 1999) . However, the basic properties of the original model of Houston & Davies (1985) were preserved when remodelling it using stable negotiation rules, namely that parents partially respond to the e¡ort of the other parent and that the outcome is a¡ected by sexual di¡erences in the costs and bene¢ts of providing care (McNamara et al. 1999) . For mathematical tractability we therefore use the traditional approach of Chase (1980) , Houston & Davies (1985) , Winkler (1987) and others.
With biparental care, male and female ¢tnesses can be expressed, respectively, as
and
where y is male investment and r scales alternative male mating opportunities relative to females. These alternative options, besides investing in the current brood, are often di¡erent for males and females (Trivers 1972; Emlen & Oring 1977; Arnold & Duvall 1994) . The important thing in our model is that r quanti¢es the sexual di¡erence in the rate of lost ¢tness through alternative opportunities, capturing the fact that an increase in paternal investment may decrease his future opportunities more than an equivalent increase would decrease those of a female (Queller 1994) . For example, males may easily increase their ¢tness through extra-pair copulations or by attracting additional mates and these opportunities are likely to be lowered with an increased current investment ( y). With the formulation used in equations (3) and (4) rˆ1 means that male and female ¢tnesses through alternative opportunities are equally a¡ected by providing parental care and r 4 1 means that males' ¢tness through alternative opportunities is more sensitive to changes in investment than that of females. In the following we will only analyse situations where r51, that is situations with equal or conventional sex roles. The optimum clutch size (n 2 * ) with biparental care maximizes the female ¢tness equation, i.e.
This optimum n 2 * must of course also allow stable biparental care, that is x * (n 2 * ) and y * (n 2 * ) must both be higher than zero. Otherwise one of the parents will not care for the young and the optimum clutch (n 2 * ) calculated from equation (5) can never persist in the population.
(b) A speci¢c model
In order to illustrate how clutch sizes will evolve and converge to the ¢tness optimum value under the above model, we will use a speci¢c model developed for describing bird provisioning of dependent nestlings (Houston & Davies 1985) because of its mathematical tractability. As above, male investment in an o¡spring is y and female investment is x. O¡spring survival is c(x, y)ˆJ(17 exp(7k( x ‡ y ¡ A))) and adult future opportunities for reproducing are a function of their own investment (i), i.e. p(i)ˆV(17 exp(7 (17n))), where J and V are survival constants and and k are shape parameters relating survival to parental investment. With these forms the o¡spring survival probability is zero if total parental investment is below a minimum necessary level (A). Thereafter survival increases with parental investment, but with diminishing returns. The o¡spring survival function implicitly assumes that there is no interaction between the parents, i.e. that o¡spring survival is the same irrespective of how a certain amount of investment is partitioned between parents. Parental future reproduction decreases in an accelerating way with parental investment, which in the original model was an e¡ect of decreased survival probability until the following season, but we give p a wider interpretation and include also future reproductive opportunities in the form of other mates the same season. It should be noted that n does not in£uence future survival if the female provides no parental care (unless x 4 0). Hence, it is assumed that nestling provisioning and not the production of the clutch constitutes the major reproductive cost. Given that parental investment in young is costly, this simpli¢cation does not alter the qualitative predictions, which is why we have kept it in this original form.
RESULTS

(a) Stable mating systems
Here we explain how the game between parents is solved in behavioural time, thereby resulting in a stable combination of male and female parental investment for a given clutch size. Besides a biparental care evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) we will, with terminology borrowed from Maynard Smith's (1977) classic paper, call a solution where the male leaves the clutch and the female takes care of the young a`duck' ESS. With r51 the speci¢c formulations used here do not allow stability of male-only care or unstable single-parent care (Ratnieks 1996) .
First, we consider a case where only females care for the young. We obtain the ¢tness equation (l fs ) of the female from equation (1) by using the speci¢c forms of c(x, 0) and p(x, n) in this expression (see Appendix A). The parental investment that maximizes ¢tness (x s * ) (see Appendix A) is found where l fs '(x)ˆ0 and l fs ''(x) 5 0. The second case is the mating system in equations (3) and (4) which describes biparental care and is in principle a game between parents played on a behavioural time-scale. The game was originally analysed by Houston & Davies (1985) and we brie£y review the solution here. Formally, the model is a two-player, asymmetrical game where the continuous strategy sets are y5 0 and x50 for the male and female, respectively. Each parent will adjust its provisioning in relation to the contribution of their partner and the male has a y strategy that maximizes his ¢tness for a given x strategy of the female and vice versa for the female. These are therefore called`best reply' strategies in order to capture the fact that they are the best replies to a given action of the`opponent'. The solution to the game is a combination ( y * , x * ) of male and female investment that is evolutionarily stable in the sense that y * is a best reply to x * and x * is a best reply to y * (Maynard Smith 1982; Motro 1994) . The analysis of the game and the simultaneous solutions of optimum male and female care are given in Appendix A. The necessary conditions for all mating systems considered are listed in table 1. If rˆ1, males and females have equal alternative opportunities besides investing in the current brood and the only possible solutions to the parental game are that both parents should provide care or that neither of them should (table1). If r 4 1 there are stable solutions where neither of the parents should provide care to o¡spring, where only the female should provide care and where both parents should provide care. Which case applies depends on the level of A, the minimum necessary amount of care and also on clutch size as this in£uences the optimum investment of males. Male optimum investment, i.e. y * (n), is zero for low clutch sizes (n), but with a larger clutch y * (n) increases above zero so that males should care only if n is higher than a certain value, (see Appendix A). If the clutch size is below this value, the optimum female care is given by x s * . If r 4 1, there is no solution where only males careöif males care so do females. For very large clutch sizes, there may be a solution whereby neither of the parents care for their young (see Appendix A).
(b) Dependency on clutch sizes
The conditions for the di¡erent mating systems in table 1 contain clutch size as a parameter, that is, with a certain clutch size and a set of values for the other parameters, only one mating system is stable. However, in any given mating system clutch size is expected to evolve, which may have consequences for the mating system as 
the male and female optimum parental investments ( y * and x * ) are both functions of clutch size. For example, all else being equal, an increase in clutch size may change the stable mating system from a`duck' ESS to biparental care (table 1) (if r 4 1 and 0 5 A 5 M(k + n)). Thus, in order to deduce the stable parental investment pattern, clutch size evolution must be taken into account, which brings us to the main object of our analysis. In order to illustrate the di¡erent possible simultaneous solutions of stable clutch size and parental care, we have chosen to plot ¢tness equations (2) and (5) simultaneously with our speci¢c forms of (c) and (p) and the stable levels of male help as functions of clutch size (¢gures 1^3). We focus on the case with higher male than female alternative mating opportunities (1 5 r) and with A low enough that a single female could successfully rear at least one o¡spring without male help. There are then three possible solutions (see Appendix A): (i) only single female care and a small clutch size can be stable (¢gure 1), (ii) only biparental care with a large clutch size can be stable (¢gure 3), or (iii) both solutions may be stable simultaneously (¢gure 2). The stability of the equilibria is determined by the value of the break-point clutch size ( ), below which male optimum care is zero. Above this value males should provide at least some care for the young. At , females in pairs and single females have equal ¢tnesses (because males do not provide paternal care in either situation). With all higher clutch sizes, paired females will have higher ¢tness than if males abandon the clutch (although this behaviour of the male would be contrary to our assumption of optimized behaviour) because the males will provide care.
We show in Appendix A that, if does not exist, males will never care and the only possible optimum in this case is a duck ESS. One important reason why might not exist is that r is high, which may occur when males lose alternative mating opportunities much faster than females with increasing investment in their current brood than females. A duck ESS is also the only solution if r is smaller, so that does exist but is so high that it is above the biparental care ESS optimum clutch size (¢gure 1). With still lower r, is in-between the optimum clutch size for duck and biparental care ESSs (¢gure 2). In this case both duck and biparental care ESSs are possible solutions. The one which actually evolves is determined by the initial conditions. If the clutch size is initially above , biparental care will evolve, whereas if it is initially below , a duck ESS evolves. Further decreasing r brings below the duck optimum clutch size (¢gure 3) and then only biparental care can be stable.
DISCUSSION
Our model demonstrates that the con£ict between males and females over the division of parental care will have a major in£uence on the evolution of clutch size. The e¡ect of parent^o¡spring con£ict on the evolution of clutch size was investigated by Godfray & Parker (1991) in an earlier study. In this paper, we demonstrate how the sexual con£ict over clutch size is resolved and that the resulting clutch size may be di¡erent than when assuming no con£ict. Thus, our model extends the results of Houston & Davies (1985) .
The important assumptions of our model are that male care becomes more valuable as clutch size increases and that males, at least in evolutionary time, adjust how much paternal care they provide to the opportunity costs paid. In a non-manipulative study of the dunnock (Prunella modularis), male help became increasingly important for reproductive success as the number of hatchlings increased (Davies & Hatchwell 1992 ). Although we are not aware of any study where brood size manipulations and male removals have been performed simultaneously, numerous studies have shown that males do respond to increased brood size with increased parental e¡ort (Clutton-Brock 1991) . Furthermore, Wright & Cuthill (1990) demonstrated that experimentally altered male care in European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) had a larger e¡ect on the female workload when brood size was larger. Several studies have directly demonstrated that males do adjust their investment in current o¡spring in relation to the availability of mates (Keenleyside 1983; Clutton-Brock 1991; Smith 1995) or extra-pair partners (Magrath & Elgar 1997) and such di¡erences also exist between species (Wittenberger 1981) . Hence, the basic requirements for the model seem to be ful¢lled.
Because female genes determine clutch size and males have little opportunity of in£uencing clutch size directly, this trait will evolve to the optimum value of females. However, the optimal clutch size from a female's perspective will depend on the amount of paternal care her mate is expected to provide. This is because, if a male cares, it enables females to lower their investment in each young, thereby changing the female ¢tness gradient on clutch size. The sexual con£ict over parental care will in turn be a¡ected by clutch size since a larger clutch makes male care more valuable. Therefore, there will be joint evolution of mating system and clutch size. Searcy & Yasukawa (1995) proposed that a mating system and the need for male parental care should coevolve, but excluded clutch size from consideration since it was unclear which sex ought to win the con£ict over clutch size. However, when male and female optimum parental investment is calculated by assuming a sexual game where each parent provides care in proportion to the contribution of the partner, males should provide care if the clutch size is higher than a certain value, i.e. . This threshold value is a function of two factors: (i) the value of paternal care to the survival of o¡spring, and (ii) the extent to which parental care a¡ects the opportunity of achieving additional matings (Westneat et al. 1990; Webster 1991) . At the same time, the evolutionary stable clutch size will depend on the amount of parental care males provide. Thus, the outcome of sexual con£ict depends on the sexual di¡erence in the costs and bene¢ts of raising young.
A di¡erent way of expressing the result is that clutch size evolution will tend to stabilize mating systems. When is lower than the optimum clutch for a duck mating system (¢gure 3), then all initial clutch sizes eventually evolve into the one with biparental care. On the other hand, only a duck ESS is possible when r 4 1 and the break-point value is above the optimum clutch for biparental care (¢gure 1). Then all initial clutch sizes will end with single female investment in the young and relatively small clutch sizes. As an outcome of this coevolution, we would expect an association between clutch size, paternal care and mating system (Silver et al. 1985) .
Clutch size and the extent to which males provide care will thus coevolve over evolutionary time such that male help will be of value to the female in circumstances when it is provided. Hence, male removal experiments (Wolf et al. 1988; Bart & Tornes 1989) will tell us little about why male parental care originally evolved (cf. Westneat et al. 1990) . The e¡ect of paternal care on alternative mating opportunities may di¡er if these opportunities are extrapair copulations or additional mates (Westneat et al. 1990 ). Factors such as female dispersion, breeding Clutch size and stability of mating systems H. G. Smith and R. Ha« rdling 2167 synchrony and the predation rate will a¡ect the operational sex ratio and, therefore, have a major in£uence on the availability of mates (Trivers 1972; Emlen & Oring 1977; Wittenberger 1981) . Male decisions may also feed back on r, the sensitivity of opportunity costs to male help, for example, because di¡erent mating systems create di¡erent opportunities for ¢nding alternative mates.
Under certain circumstances (¢gure 2) the expected clutch size and mating system will depend on the initial conditions, that is what clutch size prevailed in the population to start with. According to the model, an initial state where males provide some care for the young may select in favour of females increasing their clutch size. With higher clutch size males should increase their investment in young so that females will evolve still higher clutch sizes and so on until a stable state is reached where males give rather a lot of help and clutch sizes are relatively high. On the other hand, if clutch sizes are smaller to begin with (below ) (¢gure 2) males should not help at all. Females would then be selected in favour of decreasing their clutch size so that there would be even less bene¢t for males in helping and the end-point would be a small clutch with only females caring for the young. Here the break-point ( ) separates mating systems into either duck or biparental help ESSs.
This scenario could tentatively result in major di¡er-ences in clutch size and mating system between populations because of slightly di¡erent initial conditions. However, it may be di¤cult to infer such historic events given the fact that clutch size (or other factors governing the need for parental care) (cf. Searcy & Yasukawa 1995) will coevolve and stabilize the mating system. Thus, two populations that have evolved to di¡erent mating systems because of historical reasons only will nevertheless demonstrate di¡erences in the value of male parental care to female ¢tness.
The results in this paper stress the importance of taking sexual con£ict into consideration when modelling the evolution of clutch size. However, the evolution of other life-history variables may also be a¡ected by sexual con£ict. For example, by choosing which time of the season to produce a clutch, females may adjust the peak demand of nestlings to the seasonal availability of food, but at the same time this decision a¡ects how polygynous males allocate investment between di¡erent broods (Slagsvold & Lifjeld 1994; Smith & Sandell 1998) or males' opportunities for searching for additional mates (cf. Slagsvold & Lifjeld 1989) . Furthermore, the asynchrony of hatching dates within a clutch may be an important ¢tness-determining factor in cases where it has an e¡ect on male provisioning. In some cases males may provide more care to asynchronous broods (Slagsvold & Lifjeld 1989) and, in these cases, hatching asynchrony has been put forward as a female trait for taking advantage of males which males will have little power of in£uencing. However, other experiments have shown that males increase their investment in synchronous broods Slagsvold 1997) . This suggests that male care and hatching asynchrony will coevolve in much the same way as in the case of the clutch size presented above, but that coevolution may take place in many di¡erent ways. Thus, the interaction between life-history traits and the sexual con£icts associated with the social context may be complex and take di¡erent forms in di¡erent cases.
We thank A. Houston for reading the manuscript and two anonymous referees for valuable comments that signi¢cantly improved the manuscript.
APPENDIX A (a) Mating systems and optimum parental care
Assume that the female takes care of the o¡spring alone. Then the ¢tness equation of the female from equation (1) with our speci¢c forms of c(x) and p(x, n) takes the form
The optimum care (x s * ) of females solves l fs '(x)ˆ0 (condition for singular point) and l fs ''(x) 5 0 (for maximum) and is
If both parents provide care to the young, each one should provide in relation to how much the other parent is investing. The investment y'(x), which maximizes male ¢tness for a given investment by the female, is called his best reply (Motro 1994) This function is obtained from equation (3) by solving l m ' ( y)ˆ0 for y and checking that l m ''( y) 5 0 is true for the solution. The female's best reply can be obtained from equation (4) in an equivalent way by di¡erentiating with respect to x. The male and female best replies are, respectively,
Both of these equations are decreasing linear functions and it is therefore easy to ¢nd the solution (x * , y * ) to the game from the intersection of the best reply curves (¢gure 4). The mathematical expressions of optimum male ( y * ) and female care (x * ) at this stable equilibrium are solved from the following simultaneous equations which are the derivatives of equations (3) and (4). In order to ensure that the solution de¢nes a ¢tness maximum, the second derivatives of equations (3) and (4) must be negative.
The solutions turn out to be the following functions of clutch size:
Let MˆkA + + ln(Jk/V ). If M 5 0 neither of the best replies is positive and the only solution is (x * , y * )ˆ(0, 0). With positive M, the solutions depend on the level of A, the minimum requirement of investment for positive o¡spring survival. If x * + y * 5 A the o¡spring survival probability is zero so that parents are predicted not to care for their o¡spring and the solution is again (0, 0). From this condition it can be shown that, if 0 5 M and rˆ1, the solution is biparental care (¢gure 4a) if 2ln(Jk/V ) 5 (nA7 2). The reverse is the condition for no care. If r 4 1 and A is low so that 0 5 A 5 M/(k + n), the intersection of the best reply curves is in the fourth quadrant if M 5 (1 + k/ n)ln(r) (¢gure 4b). The solution in this case is a duck ESS and the alternative if (1 + k/ n)ln(r) 5 M is biparental care. If r 4 1 and A is high so that 0 5 M/(k + n) 5 A (¢gure 4c), A 5 x * + y * for only some of the intersections in the ¢rst quadrant (above the thickÀ' line in ¢gure 4c). As we asssume that x * + y * 5 A means zero o¡spring survival and no parental care, we obtain the condition for biparental care, i.e. (nA7 2) 5 2ln(Jk/V )7 ln(r). The reverse is the condition for no care.
We now take a closer look at the case r 4 1 and 0 5 A 5 M/(k + n) where we had the alternative solutions, i.e. a duck ESS or biparental care. If the male alternative mating opportunities are higher than those of the female, the optimum care for the male is positive (i.e. y * (n) 4 0) provided that the clutch size is larger than a certain -value which is given by ˆk ln(r) (kA ‡ ‡ ln(Jk=V ) ¡ ln(r)) .
The total amount of care an o¡spring then receives is the sum of male and female care which is
This summed parental care is higher than that which a single female provides (equation (A2)) if the clutch size is higher than , i.e. always with positive male care. In addition, a female in a pair situation provides less care than a single female (equation (A7) 5 equation (A2)) if the clutch size is higher than , again always with male care. From this it follows that, with a clutch size higher than , females in pairs always have higher ¢tness than single females. With lower clutch sizes, male help is not stable. In summary, there are three possible situations with respect to the position of relative to the humps of the ¢tness curves of single and paired females and these are shown in ¢gures 1^3. Either is high so that the only stable point is single female care (¢gure 1) or, if is somewhat lower, it may be in-between the optimum clutch sizes of single and paired females (¢gure 2) which are both stable. With still lower only biparental care can be stable (¢gure 3).
(b) Finding the optimum clutch size First, consider the case when only females care for the young. Equation (2) is the ¢tness equation of the female. The clutch size (n 1 * ) that maximizes ¢tness is then found by di¡erentiating equation (2) 
In order to ensure that n 1 * is a maximum point, the second derivative of equation (2) must be negative. We were not able to solve this explicitly, but chose a graphical solution instead. In the same way, in a mating system where both parents care for young, the ¢tness equation for maximizing is equation (5) 
Again, the value n 2 * , which solves equation (A11), is a maximum given that the second derivative is negative.
